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Are Franchisors Joint Employers under the NLRA? 
Maryssa Mataras*  
 
 
Part I: Introduction 
 
The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or “the Act”)1 defines the term “employer” 
to include “any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly”.2  The modern 
business landscape has evolved to encompass conglomerates, parent corporations, subsidiaries, 
and franchises, and as a result, “the traditional employer-employee relationship” has become 
muddled.3  Various legal doctrines have developed to address the complexity, depth, and 
multidimensionality of employment issues in the business sector.4  
 The “joint employer” doctrine, although not expressly defined in the NLRA, is a legal 
principle that expands the notion of “employer.”5  In essence, the National Labor Relations 
Board (“NRLB” or “the Board”)6 or a court may deem legally separate and independent business 
entities to be the joint employers of an aggrieved employee.  This will occur when the two 
entities “share or co-determine those matters governing the essential terms and conditions of 
                                                 
*J.D. Candidate, 2016, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., magna cum laude, 2011, Union College.  
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2015).  The author will use “NLRA” or “the Act” to collectively refer to the National Labor 
Relations (Wagner) Act of July 5, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), the Labor-Management Relations 
(Taft-Hartley) Act of June 23, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), and the Labor-Management Reporting 
& Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 518 (1959).  
2 29 U.S.C.A. § 152 (West 2015).  The definition excludes the United States, Government-owned corporations, the 
Federal Reserve Bank, states or political subdivisions, labor organizations, or “anyone acting in the capacity of 
officer or agent of such labor organization.” Id.  
3 Airborne Express, 338 N.L.R.B. 597, 599 (2002) (Member Liebman, concurring); see also Jeffrey M. Hirsch & 
Barry T. Hirsch, The Rise and Fall of Private Sector Unionism: What Next for the NLRA?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
1133, 1140–45 (2007) (identifying modern workplace management techniques and proposing alternatives that result 
in increased relevance for the NLRA).  
4 See N.L.R.B. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pa., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1121–24 (3d Cir. 1982) (explaining and 
distinguishing the “single employer” and the “joint employer” doctrines).  
5 See Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 475 (1964) (discussing the Supreme Court’s iteration of the joint 
employer doctrine).  
6 The National Labor Relations Board consists of five members appointed by the President and approved by the 
Senate.  29 U.S.C.A. § 153 (West 2015).  The Board serves to review Administrative Law Judges’ recommendations 
and findings of facts after a hearing of complaints under the NLRA, and issue decisions. ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., 
LABOR LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 68 (15th ed. 2011).  
employment”7 and have “historically chosen to handle jointly . . . important aspects of their 
employer-employee relationship.”8  In such cases, the two business entities, although otherwise 
viewed by the law as separate, are both, in the eyes of the law, considered employers of a 
particular individual and both entities must be held to the obligations of employers under the Act.  
Shared decision-making in matters governing the essential terms and condition of 
employment is the foundation of the current joint employer test under the NLRA which was 
articulated in 1982 by the Third Circuit in N.L.R.B. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pennsylvania, 
Inc.9  Shortly after, in 1984, the NLRB adopted the Third Circuit’s joint employer test.10 Yet, the 
Board expanded on the Third Circuit’s standard by defining essential terms and conditions of 
employment as those “such as hiring, firing, disciplining, supervision, and direction of 
employees”11 and requiring the putative joint employer’s control over these terms and conditions 
of employment to be direct and immediate.12  Prior to 1984 the joint employer analysis under the 
NLRA was “somewhat more amorphous,”13 with a variety of standards, depending on 
jurisdiction.  Despite the initial variations among the standards, the current joint employer test 
had remained settled law under the NLRA for thirty years.14 
In April of 2014, however, the NLRB issued a formal notice that it would accept amicus 
briefs to address the Board’s longstanding joint employer standard articulated in TLI, Inc. and 
                                                 
7 N.L.R.B. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pennsylvania, Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1123 (3d Cir. 1982) citing C.R. Adams 
Trucking, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 563 (1982), Ref-Chem Co. v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1969), and NLRB v. 
Greyhound Corp., 368 F.2d 778, 780 (5th Cir. 1966). 
8 N.L.R.B. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pennsylvania, Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1122 (3d Cir. 1982) quoting. N.L.R.B. v. 
Checker Cab Co., 367 F.2d 692, 698 (6th Cir. 1966). 
9 N.L.R.B. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pennsylvania, Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1123 (3d Cir. 1982). 
10 TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798 (1984), enfd. 772 D.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1985); Laerco Transportation, 269 N.L.R.B. 324, 
325 (1984).  
11 Laerco Transportation, 269 N.L.R.B. 324, 325 (1984). 
12 TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798, 798-99 (1984); also see Airborne Express, 338 N.L.R.B. 597 n.1 (2002) for the 
Board’s majority noting the requirement direct and immediate control in its joint employer analysis.  
13 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. & Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, Indus. & Allied Workers Helpers Loc. 
Un. No. 920, 312 N.L.R.B. 674, 676 (1993). 
14 Airborne Express, 338 N.L.R.B. 597 (2002) (refusing to alter the joint employer standard). 
Lacero Transportation.15  This indicated the Board’s reconsideration of the existing standard. 
The briefs were to consider whether the Board should adhere to the existing joint employer 
standard or adopt a new one, and accepted proposals as to what the new standard should be.16 
And despite another longstanding precedent that franchisors are not typically joint employers 
with their franchisees, several Regional Offices of the National Labor Relations Board17 have 
since issued unfair labor practice complaints against McDonald’s USA, LLC, one of the world’s 
largest and best known franchisors, as a “joint employer respondent”.18  It is possible that these 
Regional Offices of the NLRB have changed their joint employer standard in issuing these 
complaints, yet, it is also possible that the facts and circumstances with respect to this franchisor 
led the Regional Offices to deem McDonald’s USA, LLC a putative joint employer without 
altering its well-settled joint employer test. Additionally, in February of 2015 the Senate 
Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions held a full hearing on the issue of the joint 
                                                 
15 Notice and Invitation to File Briefs Regarding the Board’s Current Joint Employer Standard Under TLI, Inc., 271 
N.L.R.B. 798 (1984), enfd. mem. 772 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1985), and Laerco Transportation, 269 N.L.R.B. 324 (1984), 
National Labor Relations Board (May 12, 2014), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-
invites-briefs-joint-employment-standard.  
16 Id. 
17 Since November 2012 at least 310 unfair labor practice charges were made against McDonald’s, USA, LLC filed 
in Regions 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 25, 27, 28, and 31. Fact Sheet, McDonald’s Fact 
Sheet, National Labor Relations Board Office of the General Counsel, available at http://www.nlrb.gov/news-
outreach/fact-sheets/mcdonalds-fact-sheet. Of those charges, 149 have been closed, 54 are pending investigation as 
to the merits of the claim, and 107 have been found have merit and approximately 10 of the meritorious cases have 
been made against corporate-owned McDonald’s storefronts. Id. The 107 meritorious charges against McDonald’s, 
USA, LLC have been filed in Regions 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 13, 14, 15, 18, 20, 21, 25, 28, and 31. Id. And in December 
2014, the NLRB Office of the General Counsel issued a statement that it will consolidate the meritorious charges 
against McDonald’s franchisees and their franchisor, McDonald’s, USA, LLC, to take place in a few NLRB 
Regional Offices throughout the country. Press Release, NLRB Office of the General Counsel Issues Consolidated 
Complaints Against McDonald's Franchisees and their Franchisor McDonald's, USA, LLC as Joint Employers, 
National Labor Relations Board, (Dec 19, 2014), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-
office-general-counsel-issues-consolidated-complaints-against. 
18 See Press Release, NLRB Office of the General Counsel Authorizes Complaints Against McDonald's Franchisees 
and Determines McDonald's, USA, LLC is a Joint Employer, National Labor Relations Board, (July 29, 2014), 
available at http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-office-general-counsel-authorizes-complaints-
against-mcdonalds; see Press Release, NLRB Office of the General Counsel Issues Consolidated Complaints 
Against McDonald's Franchisees and their Franchisor McDonald's, USA, LLC as Joint Employers, National Labor 
Relations Board, (Dec 19, 2014), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-office-general-
counsel-issues-consolidated-complaints-against. 
employer standard under the NLRA, and specifically mentioned the issues of this standard the 
context of franchises.19  
This comment will articulate the history of the joint employer doctrine in the context of 
franchises and will investigate the potential reasoning behind the recent (potential) change of 
position that several of the Regional Offices have made regarding the joint employer status of 
franchisors. And lastly, it will suggest a new franchise-specific joint employer standard that 
requires a franchisor’s direct and actual control over the instrumentality of the employee’s 
alleged harm. Part II of this comment will provide the general overview of the joint employer 
doctrine under the National Labor Relations Act. Part III will explain the commercial nature of 
franchises noting its unique intersection of franchisors’ control over their franchisees and 
franchisees’ independence. Part IV discusses the consequences of maintaining the same joint 
employer standard and of adopting the former joint employer standard; and will then propose a 
new joint employer standard unique to franchises.  
Part II: Joint Employer Doctrine Under the NLRA 
1. The Current Joint Employer Standard Under the NLRA 
The Supreme Court articulated that the joint employer determination must be a factual 
inquiry to determine whether the putative joint employer displayed a “sufficient indicia of 
control”20 over the employee.21  Following this precedent, prior to 1984, the courts and Board 
                                                 
19 Who’s the Boss? The “Joint Employer” Standard and Business Ownership: Hearing Before the Full Sen. Comm. 
on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 114th Cong. (2015) (where leaders of the Committee and witnesses, 
including a law professor, a lawyer, and franchise owners, evaluated and pontificated on the consequences of 
maintaining or changing the current joint employer standard); see Catherine Ruckelshaus & Mike Munoz, Who's the 
Boss? Why Republicans Are Missing the Point on Joint Employer, Huffington Post (Feb. 6, 2015, 5:36 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/catherine-ruckelshaus/joint-employment_b_6633602.html (for a critique on the 
Republican committee members calling for the Board to maintain the current joint employer standard).  
20 Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 481 (1964).  
21 See Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964) (remanding to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for further 
proceedings to assess the factual circumstances regarding the level of control of Greyhound, a company that 
operates bus terminals, and Floors, Inc. a corporation that provides cleaning and maintenance services to 
implemented several varying tests to determine the sufficiency of control that would properly 
warrant a joint employer determination under the NLRA.22  The varying tests, however, each 
weighed the importance of certain factors differently or exclusively analyzed certain factors in its 
inquiry.  The Second Circuit looked to a putative joint employer’s immediate control over 
employees with respect to hiring, firing, discipline, pay, insurance, records, supervision and 
participation in the collective bargaining process.23  The Third and Fifth Circuits looked to 
“whether the employer shared or codetermined matters governing the employees' essential terms 
and conditions of employment.”24  The Fourth Circuit analyzed the sufficiency of control over 
the employee’s work.25  The Eighth Circuit, endorsed a four-factor test of (1) common 
ownership, (2) common management, (3) interrelation of operations, and (4) centralized control 
of labor relations.26  The Ninth Circuit focused on the level of the employer’s authority over 
“authority over employment conditions, which are within the area of mandatory collective 
bargaining.”27  And the D.C. Circuit looked to “the amount of actual and potential control” 28 the 
putative joint employer has over the employees.  The putative joint employer’s control could be 
                                                 
Greyhound, exercise over porters, janitors, and maids, to determine whether a bargaining unit consisting of such 
employees under the alleged joint employer relationship is appropriate).   
22 Clinton's Ditch Co-op Co. v. N.L.R.B., 778 F.2d 132, 137–38 (2d Cir. 1985) (comparing the joint employer 
standards under the NLRA among the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits).  
23 Clinton's Ditch Co-op Co. v. N.L.R.B., 778 F.2d 132, 137-40 (2d Cir. 1985) citing International House v. NLRB, 
676 F.2d 906, 912 (2d Cir.1982) for its standard. 
24 Clinton's Ditch Co-op Co. v. N.L.R.B., 778 F.2d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 1985) citing NLRB v. Browning-Ferris 
Industries of Pennsylvania, Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1123 (3d Cir.1982); Ref-Chem Company v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 127, 
129 (5th Cir.1969). 
25 Clinton's Ditch Co-op Co. v. N.L.R.B., 778 F.2d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 1985) citing NLRB v. Jewell Smokeless Coal 
Corp., 435 F.2d 1270, 1271 (4th Cir. 1970).  
26 Clinton's Ditch Co-op Co. v. N.L.R.B., 778 F.2d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 1985) citing Pulitzer Publishing Co. v. NLRB, 
618 F.2d 1275, 1279 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 875 [101 S.Ct. 217, 66 L.Ed.2d 96]  
27 Clinton's Ditch Co-op Co. v. N.L.R.B., 778 F.2d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 1985) citing Sun Maid Growers v. NLRB, 618 
F.2d 56, 59 (9th Cir.1980); mandatory subjects of bargaining expressly includes “wages, hours, and other conditions 
of employment[.]” 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (West 2015). 
28 Clinton's Ditch Co-op Co. v. N.L.R.B., 778 F.2d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 1985) citing International Chemical Workers 
Union Local 483 v. NLRB, 561 F.2d 253, 255 (D.C. Cir.1977).  
direct, in that it directly and jointly controlled labor relations, or indirect, in that it sufficiently 
controlled the other employer in its decisions regarding its labor relations.29 
Since the NLRB articulated the current joint employment test under the NLRA in 1984 in 
TLI, Inc. and Lacero Transportation the standard for joint employment has continued to be that a 
putative entity is a joint employer if it jointly shares or co-determines matters governing the 
essential terms and conditions of employment,30 such as hiring, firing, disciplining, supervision, 
and direction of employees.31  And the Board has stated that the control over these matters must 
be direct and immediate.32  It is likely that the 1984 standard narrowed the scope of joint 
employment, by requiring direct and immediate control, meaning that entities could exercise 
indirect control over the employment relations of another entity without being named a joint 
employer.  
A substantive and large body of law has formed under the NLRB’s 30-year-old current 
joint employer standard, especially with respect to franchises, contractors, and employment 
services agencies, because the traditional notions of the employer-employee relationship are 
blurred in these contexts.33  This body of law focuses on the levels of control that warrant joint 
employer status.  
The Board determined that the joint employment concept is independent of the single 
employer or integrated enterprise doctrine;34 therefore, the finding of joint employer status is not 
                                                 
29 See Floyd Epperson, 202 N.L.R.B. 23, 24–28 (1973), enforced mem., 491 F.2d 1390 (6th Cir. 1974) for examples 
of indirect and direct control.  
30 TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798, 802–03 (1984) citing N.L.R.B. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pennsylvania, Inc., 691 
F.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1982).  
31 Laerco Transportation, 269 N.L.R.B. 324, 325 (1984). 
32 See Laerco Transportation, 269 N.L.R.B. 324 (1984); see TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798, 798–99 (1984); also see 
Airborne Express, 338 N.L.R.B. 597 n.1 (2002) for the Board’s majority noting the requirement direct and 
immediate control in its joint employer analysis.  
33 Airborne Express, 338 N.L.R.B. 597 (2002) (Member Liebman, concurring). 
34 The single employer doctrine is a legal concept that treats two separate business entities as one when both entities 
are sufficiently integrated. Radio & Television Broad. Technicians Local Union 1264 v. Broad. Serv. of Mobile, 
contingent upon the two (or more) employers being heavily integrated so that the entity can be 
viewed as one single integrated entity and therefore one single employer.35  
With respect to employment agencies, the joint employer determination is a fact-sensitive 
inquiry regarding a sufficiency of control. Joint employment status was affirmed by the Sixth 
Circuit when an employment agency leased drivers to handle the transportation needs of a 
manufacturing company when the manufacturer had substantial day-today control over the 
drivers’ working conditions, wages, benefits, hiring and firing.36  The NLRB, however, found 
that an employee was solely employed by an employment agency, and denied joint employment 
status, when the agency referred and placed an employee in a milk processing plant for 
employment when the processing company instructed the employee of when and where to take 
his breaks, disciplined the employee about his excessive break times and terminated the 
employee but maintained a timecard for the agency’s use.37  
With respect to employment agencies,38 the NLRB found that two entities were no longer 
joint employers when they started to disentangle by one employer’s ceasing control over the 
daily operations of the employees, stopping twice-daily joint supervisory meetings, and requiring 
each entity to have its own telephone and automobiles to transfer employees.39  The NLRB also 
established in the same case, that an entity is not liable for unlawful conduct that occurs before or 
                                                 
Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965). This analysis often evaluates “interrelation of operations, common management, 
centralized control of labor relations and common ownership” between the two independent businesses. Id. 
35 Martiki Coal Corp., 315 N.L.R.B. 476, 477 (1994); see N.L.R.B. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pennsylvania, Inc., 
691 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1982) for an analysis of the distinctions between the single employer and joint employer 
doctrines.  
36 Carrier Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 768 F.2d 778, 781–82 (6th Cir. 1985). 
37 Flav-O-Rich, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 262, 264–65 (1992). 
38 An employment agency is any entity that is in the business of finding employment and brokers labor for a fee. 
Garson v. Div. of Labor Enforcement, Dep't of Indus. Relations, 33 Cal. 2d 861, 863, 206 P.2d 368, 369 (1949); 
Florida Indus. Commission v. Manpower, Inc. of Miami, 91 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 1956). 
39 Martiki Coal Corp., 315 N.L.R.B. 476, 477–78 (1994). 
after an entity is a joint employer; and therefore is liable only for conduct that occurs while the 
two entities retain joint employer status.40   
There is a significant amount of law regarding joint employment under the NLRA for 
contracting and subcontracting work.41  Under the rules of agency, an individual or entity hiring 
an independent contractor does not necessarily exercise enough control to deem the independent 
contractor an agent of the individual or entity.42  As such, the latter is not usually vicariously 
liable for the conduct of the independent contractor.43  As might be expected, however, labeling a 
company as an independent contractor in the context of the NLRA requires a more detailed 
analysis.44  The NLRB will conduct an inquiry into the indicia of control, as it would with any 
alleged joint employers, to determine whether or not the two entities are, in fact, joint 
employers.45 
A business that contracts work to another entity is a joint employer with the contractor 
when the business “jointly shares or co-determines matters governing the essential terms and 
conditions of employment.”46  The Fifth Circuit affirmed the NLRB’s finding that a contractor of 
janitorial services, and the company utilizing those services, are joint employers when: (1) the 
                                                 
40 Id.  
41 See generally Cabot Corp., 223 N.L.R.B. 1388 (1976); Thums Long Beach Co. 295 N.L.R.B. 101 (1989); Solid 
Waste Services, Inc. 313 N.L.R.B. 385 (1993). 
42 An independent contractor may or may not be an agent of the hiring entity or person and “contracts with another 
to do something for him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the other's right to control with respect 
to his physical conduct in the performance of the undertaking. He may or may not be an agent.” Restatement 
(Second) of Agency § 2 (1958).  
43 See Vagle v. Pickands Mather & Co., 611 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1979) (noting the potential forms of liability for 
companies that hire independent contractors); Ackerman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 555 F. Supp. 93, 94 (D.N.D. 1982) 
(denying defendant’s motion to dismiss because the record indicated a genuine issue of material fact regarding the 
level of control defendant had over a contractor’s employee).   
44 An analysis regarding the vicarious liability of an entity that hires an independent contractor is a fact intensive 
inquiry regarding the level of control and typically no single factor or controlling, including the labeling of an entity 
as an independent contractor is not dispositive. Slayman v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 1033, 1037 
(9th Cir. 2014); Interstate Fire & Cas. Co. v. Washington Hosp. Ctr. Corp., 758 F.3d 378, 381 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
45 Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 475 (1964).  
46 TLI, Inc., 271 NLRB 798, 798–99 (1984) citing N.L.R.B v. Browning-Ferris Industries, 691 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 
1982). 
company influences the contractor’s hiring and firing decisions,47 (2) the company has control 
over the contractor’s employment policies and; (3) the contractor’s employees seek to unionize, 
the company participates in the collective bargaining process and hires (and exclusively pays for) 
a labor relations consultant.48  In contrast, a different janitorial services contractor is not a joint 
employer with a property management firm when the management firm merely retains the right 
to review performance of the janitors and checks the janitor’s work each day, while the 
contractor provides its own supervisor who assigns tasks to the janitors each day.49 
Franchises, like contractors and employment agencies, also fall into a category in which 
the traditional, single-employer notion is blurred50 and joint employment status is possible.  The 
aforementioned cases demonstrate that finding joint employment with respect to employment 
agencies and contractors varies depending on the factual circumstances.  The NLRB’s joint 
employer inquiry in the context of franchises has been somewhat consistent,51 i.e., franchisors 
and their franchisees are not joint employers.  Even prior to 1984, when indirect control was 
sufficient for joint employment, courts and the Board determined that franchisors are not joint 
employers because franchisors are given more flexibility in their control for the sake of 
protecting their brand and its uniformity.52  For example, when a franchisor enters into a 
franchise agreement in which franchisees agree to maintain certain standards of the company 
                                                 
47 Texas World Service Co. v. N.L.R.B, 928 F.2d 1426, 1433 (5th Cir. 1991). 
48 Id.  
49 Serv. Employees Union, 312 N.L.R.B. 715, 736 (1993).  
50 Airborne Express, 338 N.L.R.B. 597 (2002) (Member Liebman, concurring).  
51 Richard Griffin Jr., General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board, Keynote Speech at the West Virginia 
University College of Law Labor Law Conference 2014: Zealous Advocacy for Social Change (October 24, 2014), 
available at 
http://wvulaw.mediasite.com/Mediasite/Play/31e143f0990647558b0268e9086ca3e41d?catalog=7e011120-398b-
494f-8ce8-9e0aa870d371.  
52 Id.; Love’s Barbeque Rest. 245 N.L.R.B. 78, 120 (1978); Tilden, S. G., Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 752, 753 (1968); 
Speedee 7-Eleven, 170 N.L.R.B. 1332, 1333 (1968); Yellow Cab Co., 208 N.L.R.B. 1020, 1021 (1974); see Robert 
W. Emerson, Franchising and the Collective Rights of Franchisees, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1503, 1528 (1990). 
with respect to housekeeping and pricing, and the franchisor does not exercise “direct control 
over the labor relations” of the franchisees, there is no joint employment53  And again, the NLRB 
ruled that a franchisor and franchisee were not joint employers when the franchisor paid the 
employees and provided recommendations for employment relations but did not have the right to 
exercise control over such relations.54  These two cases, both decided by the NLRB in 1968, 
became the most precedential cases with respect to joint employment among franchisees and 
franchisors.55 
In short, once the current and narrower standard was promulgated, which requires direct 
control by the putative joint employer, franchisors have not been found to be joint employers 
because their control is derived from their relationship with the franchisee exclusively and not 
directly with the employees.56  The NLRB’s recent issuance of several unfair labor practice 
complaints against a franchisor, McDonald’s USA LLC, however, demonstrated the possibility 
of turning this well-settled notion on its head.57 
2. Consequences of Joint Employer Status Under the NLRA  
Joint employers are held to the same statutory obligations as single employers.58  Under 
the NLRA, the obligations of employers are plentiful. An employer falling under the jurisdiction 
of the Act may not interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the right to, and 
                                                 
53 Tilden, S. G., Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 752, 753 (1968). 
54 Speedee 7-Eleven, 170 N.L.R.B. 1332, 1333 (1968). 
55 Tilden, 172 N.L.R.B. at 753; Speedee, 170 N.L.R.B. at 1333. 
56 This finding is not exclusive to franchises.  See Cynatron Enters., 216 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1120 (1975) (holding that 
two entities were not joint employers when one company had no direct control, but only indirect control, by virtue of 
a contract).  
57 Press Release, NLRB Office of the General Counsel, NLRB Office of the General Counsel Issues Consolidated 
Complaints Against McDonald's Franchisees and their Franchisor McDonald's, USA, LLC as Joint Employers (Dec 
19, 2014), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-office-general-counsel-issues-
consolidated-complaints-against. 
58 Additionally, as joint employers, each entity “is responsible for the conduct of the other and whatever unlawful 
practices are engaged in by the one must be deemed to have been committed by both.”  Hillside Manor Health 
Related Facility, 257 NLRB 981, 985 (1981) (citing Ref-Chem Co.,169 N.L.R.B. 376, 380 (1968)). 
the right to refrain from, self-organization, bargaining collectively and engaging in concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.59  Employers 
are also required to bargain in good faith regarding certain subjects of employment.60  Finally, 
covered employers may not exert domination over the labor organizations formed by the 
employees61 and may not discriminate among union and nonunion workers, materials or 
information.62  
The jurisdiction of the NLRA for employers is typically contingent upon on two 
elements—the industry of the employer63 and its affect on interstate commerce, in quantitative 
monetary terms.64  “[I]t is well established that the commerce data of joint or single employers 
may appropriately be combined for jurisdictional purposes.”65  Accordingly, there are instances 
in which an employer is not within the NLRA when independent but, when said employer 
becomes a joint employer with another entity, the two employers, together, meet the 
jurisdictional requirement of affecting commerce under the NLRA.66  Therefore, the employees 
of the joint employers that now meet the jurisdictional requirements of the Act are awarded the 
rights to self-organize, unionize, collectively bargain, and engage in concerted activities for 
                                                 
59 29 U.S.C.A. § 157 (West 2015) (granting employees rights); 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (West 2015) (making it an unfair 
labor practice to violate § 157 rights).  
60 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (West 2015); these subjects are called the mandatory subjects of bargaining and include 
“wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment” and require that the parties exercise good faith with 
respect to these aforementioned subjects. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d) (West 2015). 
61 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (West 2015). 
62 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (West 2015). 
63 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(6),(7) (West 2015). 
64 ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 54 (15th ed. 2011).  
65 Valentine Properties, 319 N.L.R.B 8 (1995) citing 73–381 South Broadway Associates, 304 N.L.R.B. 1108 
(1991). 
66 See Hudson Ridge Owners Corp. & Hudson Ridge Owners Corp., 313 NLRB 1055, 1058 (1994) (noting that one 
of two joint employers independently does not meet the jurisdictional requirement of $500,000 in gross receipts 
under the Act but as joint employer with another entity, the two entities, together, meet the $500,000 threshold and 
therefore together fall within the jurisdiction of the Act).  
mutual aid and protection of the employees, whereas they were not afforded these rights before 
its employer became a joint employer with another entity.67  
The power to unionize is likely the most significant right granted to employees under the 
NLRA. Since the NLRB’s recent naming of McDonald’s as a joint employer with several of its 
franchisees, the possibility for unionization has increased.68 
With respect to collective bargaining, a union that wins a representation election is 
approximately 40-50% likely to create a contract with an employer; whereas, if a union loses an 
election, the probability for reaching a collective bargaining agreement is around 10%.69  In 
terms of employee earnings, where most of the research of impact of unionization is focused, 
earlier studies found a large wage disparity between union and nonunion workers in the same 
position and industry.70  More recent studies, however, have undercut these findings.71  As of 
late, several different studies have concluded that unionization has little affect on average 
wages.72  But one author notes that unionization “significantly compresses the distribution of 
                                                 
67 Notably, if one of the joint employers does not fall within the definition of employer under the Act, this will not 
preclude bargaining between the employees and the other joint employer. This is especially important when a 
company contracts with the government, which is excluded as an employer under the Act. The Board has ruled that 
in cases as such it will only not consider the government agency and look to whether or not the non-government 
employer, independently, meets the jurisdictional requirements of the act. See Management Training, 317 N.L.R.B. 
1355 (1995).  
68 Steven Greenhouse, McDonald’s Ruling Could Open Door for Unions, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/business/nlrb-holds-mcdonalds-not-just-franchisees-liable-for-worker-
treatment.html?_r=0.   
69 BRIGHAM R. FRANDSEN, WHY UNIONS STILL MATTER: THE EFFECTS OF UNIONIZATION ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF 
EMPLOYEE EARNINGS 13 (2012), available at http://economics.mit.edu/files/6950. 
70 See David Card, The Effect of Unions on the Structure of Wages: A Longitudinal Analysis, 64 ECONOMETRICA, 
957 (1996), available at http://davidcard.berkeley.edu/papers/union-struct-wage.pdf. 
71 See BRIGHAM R. FRANDSEN, WHY UNIONS STILL MATTER: THE EFFECTS OF UNIONIZATION ON THE DISTRIBUTION 
OF EMPLOYEE EARNINGS, supra note 68 at 14; John DiNardo & David S. Lee, Economic Impacts of New 
Unionization on Private Sector Employers: 1984–2001, 119 (4) THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 1383, 
1389-93 (2004); Richard B. Freeman & Morris M. Kleiner, The Impact of New Unionization on Wages and Working 
Conditions, 8 (1) JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS S8, S8–S25 (1990).  
72 See BRIGHAM R. FRANDSEN, WHY UNIONS STILL MATTER: THE EFFECTS OF UNIONIZATION ON THE DISTRIBUTION 
OF EMPLOYEE EARNINGS, supra note 68 at 14; John DiNardo & David S. Lee, Economic Impacts of New 
Unionization on Private Sector Employers: 1984–2001, 119 (4) THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 1383, 
1389-93 (2004); Richard B. Freeman & Morris M. Kleiner, The Impact of New Unionization on Wages and Working 
Conditions, 8 (1) JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS S8, S8–S25 (1990).  
employee earnings,”73 meaning that those at the bottom of the wages scale for a particular 
employer may experience an increase in pay whereas those at the top may see no change at all or 
a decrease in salary.74  Another study agrees, finding that, “wage differentials by age, education, 
and region are typically smaller for unionized workers.”75  Yet another study indicates that 
unionization does not seem to affect employment rates but companies that did unionize, 
experienced slower growth rates than those entities that did not.76  One analysis concluded, 
however, that an election that results in favor of unionization decreases the value of the 
company’s stock by at least $40,500 per voter, meaning that investors appear hostile to 
unionization.77  As one can tell, the jury is still out regarding the exact impacts of organization 
on wages but the economic analyses.  
Part III: Franchises 
Franchising is a method of selling and marketing goods and services that creates a 
network of independently owned businesses that have the right to sell the products or services of 
another, usually larger and well-known, business entity. 78  This method of business expansion 
has experienced dramatic growth in the last half-century and has significant impact on the 
                                                 
73 See BRIGHAM R. FRANDSEN, WHY UNIONS STILL MATTER: THE EFFECTS OF UNIONIZATION ON THE DISTRIBUTION 
OF EMPLOYEE EARNINGS, supra note 68 at 14.  
74 Id.  
75 See David Card, The Effect of Unions on the Structure of Wages: A Longitudinal Analysis, 64 ECONOMETRICA, 
957, 976 (1996), available at http://davidcard.berkeley.edu/papers/union-struct-wage.pdf. 
76 Richard B. Freeman & Morris M. Kleiner, The Impact of New Unionization on Wages and Working Conditions, 8 
(1) JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS S8, S8–S25 (1990). 
77 David Lee & Alexandre Mas, Long-Run Impact of Union on Firms: New Evidence From Financial Markets 1961-
1991 (National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 14709, February 2009); this study suggests that 
the negative reaction of investors regarding unionization is because it is believed that unionizing leads to less 
company growth, and fewer economic opportunities for the company. Id. at 36.  
78 Joseph H. King, Jr., Limiting the Vicarious Liability of Franchisors for the Torts of Their Franchisees, 62 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 417, 420 (2005) citing MARTIN MENDELSOHN, THE GUIDE TO FRANCHISING 1 (6th ed. 1999).  
nation’s economy, especially in the retail industry.79  In 2007, franchised businesses directly 
contributed over 9 million jobs and $468 billion GDP80 to the U.S. economy.81 
The International Franchise Association defines a franchise as an “agreement or license 
between two legally independent parties” which gives:  
[1] a person or group of people (franchisee) the right to market a product or service using 
the trademark or trade name of another business (franchisor); [2] the franchisee the right 
to market a product or service using the operating methods of the franchisor; [3] the 
franchisee the obligation to pay the franchisor fees for these rights; [and 4] the franchisor 
the obligation to provide rights and support to franchisees.”82   
 
The relationship between the franchisee and franchisor is created through a contract, 
typically called a Franchise Agreement.83  These contracts tend to have several standard terms in 
which the franchisee: (1) accepts managerial assistance from the franchisors; (2) agrees to run 
the business in a manner delineated by the franchisor; (3) pays royalties, usually in a percentage 
of sales to the franchisor; and (4) agrees to a termination clause usual at the will of the 
franchisor.84 
 The franchise model has the overarching structure of licensing an independent business 
owner to sell certain products or services and has two most popular formats—product 
                                                 
79 Michael R. Flynn, The Law of Franchisor Vicarious Liability: A Critique, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 89, 89 
(1993).  
80 GDP is an acronym for Gross Domestic Product and Gross domestic product “is an aggregate measure of 
production equal to the sum of the gross values added of all resident institutional units engaged in production (plus 
any taxes, and minus any subsidies, on products not included in the value of their outputs). The sum of the final uses 
of goods and services (all uses except intermediate consumption) measured in purchasers' prices, less the value of 
imports of goods and services, or the sum of primary incomes distributed by resident producer units.” 
ORGANISATION FOR CO-ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT, GLOSSARY OF STATISTICAL TERMS, available at 
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1163.  
81 INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISE ASSOCIATION, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF FRANCHISED BUSINESSES I-14 (Vol. 3, Results 
for 2007), available at http://www.buildingopportunity.com/download/National%20Views.pdf. 
82 INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISE ASSOCIATION, WHAT IS A FRANCHISE?, 
http://www.franchise.org/franchiseesecondary.aspx?id=52625 (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).  
83 See Mac's Shell Serv., Inc. v. Shell Oil Products Co. LLC, 559 U.S. 175 (2010), Han v. Mobil Oil Corp., 73 F.3d 
872 (9th Cir. 1995), Shukla v. BP Exploration & Oil, Inc., 115 F.3d 849 (11th Cir. 1997) 
 for potential issues with franchise agreements.  
84 Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract, 21 J.L. & ECON. 223, 224 
(1978).  
franchising and business format franchising.85  The structure of the relationship between the 
franchisor and franchisee, however, varies greatly, depending on the terms and conditions of the 
agreement.86 
 There are advantages and disadvantages of franchising.  The franchisor typically bears 
the national advertising costs and the burden of the mechanisms and infrastructure to ensure 
quality and management standards.87  The franchisor is able to expand its business more quickly 
than it would without a franchise arrangement because the initial capital to establish an outlet is 
obtained by the franchisee, allowing the franchisor to receive royalty payments for a fraction of 
the effort and costs required to run an entire store.88  Franchisees make smaller profit margins 
because of royalty payments made to the franchisor and are confined to the limitations and 
control set out by the franchisor.89  Yet, franchisees run their business on a brand that already 
has, hopefully, legitimacy, good will, and integrity; an existing brand reduces amount of risk for 
a franchisee.90  And often the franchisor requires and provides a predetermined infrastructure, 
while franchisees still get the opportunity to manage their own stores.91  Franchises also benefit 
                                                 
85 Joseph H. King, Jr., Limiting the Vicarious Liability of Franchisors for the Torts of Their Franchisees, 62 Wash. 
& Lee L. Rev. 417, 422 (2005); see Who’s the Boss? The “Joint Employer” Standard and Business Ownership: 
Hearing Before the Full Sen. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 114th Cong. (2015) (for Gerald F. 
Moore, a witness for the hearing and franchise owner, for an example of the provisions of franchise agreements).   
86 Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract, 21 J.L. & ECON. 223, 224 
(1978); see James A. Brickley, Incentive Conflicts and Contractual Restraints: Evidence from Franchising, 42 J.L. 
& ECON. 745 (1999) (demonstrating possible conflicts and issues that stem from the contractual relationship 
between franchisors and franchisees).  
87 Stephanie Sullivant, Restoring the Uniformity: An Examination of Possible Systems to Classify Franchisees for 
Workers' Compensation Purposes, 81 UMKC L. REV. 993, 998 (2013).  
88 Barbara Beshel, INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISE ASSOCIATION EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
FRANCHISING (2010), available at 
http://www.franchise.org/uploadedFiles/Franchise_Industry/Resources/Education_Foundation/introtofranchising_fin
al.pdf; Joseph H. King, Jr., Limiting the Vicarious Liability of Franchisors for the Torts of Their Franchisees, 62 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 417, 422 (2005). 
89 Peter Cappelli & Monika Hamori, Are Franchises Bad Employers?, 61 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 147 (2008).  
90 John L. Hanks, Franchisor Liability for the Torts of its Franchisees: The Case for Substituting Liability as a 
Guarantor for the Current Vicarious Liability, 24 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1, 28–31 (1999).  
91 Barbara Beshel, INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISE ASSOCIATION EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
FRANCHISING (2010), available at 
the public.  Aside from job opportunities, franchises provide a uniform quality of their product or 
services, and consumers can expect a standard of quality when entering any of the franchised 
stores.92 
The business format franchise is the most popular franchise model, most commonly 
employed by fast food restaurants and convenience stores.93  This model licenses a franchisee to 
use and sell a franchisor’s products, services, or trademark and “the complete method to conduct 
the business itself.”94  Typically the franchisee pays an initial large licensing fee.95  The 
franchisee typically agrees to adhere to the quality and control standards of the franchisor, 
observe the franchisor’s uniform format, and pay royalty payments to the franchisor.96  The 
franchisor will typically provide training, operation manuals, standards, and advertising.97 
 In contrast, product distribution franchises sell and distribute the franchisor’s products. 
The “franchisor licenses its trademark and logo to the franchisees but typically does not provide 
them with an entire system for running their business.”98  This format of franchising is most 
commonly found in the automobile, gasoline and soft drink industries.99  
                                                 
http://www.franchise.org/uploadedFiles/Franchise_Industry/Resources/Education_Foundation/introtofranchising_fin
al.pdf.   
92 Heather Carson Perkins, et al., Franchisor Liability for Acts of the Franchisee, 29-WTR FRANCHISE L.J. 174 
(2010). 
93 David J. Kaufmann, An Overview of the Business and Law of Franchising (Managing Legal Issues in Franchising: 
Leading Lawyers on Helping Clients Master the Ownership Process and Avoid Legal Conflicts), 2013 WL 3773409 
(2013).  
94 INT’L FRANCHISE ASS’N, WHAT IS A FRANCHISE?, available at 
http://www.franchise.org/franchiseesecondary.aspx?id=52625 (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).  
95 Christian C. Burden & Sean Trende, The Economic Loss Rule and Franchise Attorneys, 27 FRANCHISE L.J. 192, 
194 (2008) (citation omitted). 
96 Barbara Beshel, An Introduction to Franchising, INT’L FRANCHISE ASS’N EDUC. FOUND. (Apr. 17, 2015, 3:39 
PM), http://www.franchise.org/an-introduction-to-franchising. 
97 Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract, 21 J.L. & ECON. 223, 224 
(1978). 
98 What Is a Franchise, INT’L FRANCHISE ASS’N, http://www.franchise.org/franchiseesecondary.aspx?id=52625 (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2015). 
99 Id.  
 Given the structure of franchising, with the unique dichotomy of the franchisee’s 
autonomy and the franchisor’s ability to control facets of the franchisee’s business, the 
traditional notions of a single employer, in the franchise context, have become muddled. 
Nevertheless, the NLRB had somewhat consistently refused to name a franchisor a joint 
employer with its franchisees in the past but this precedent may change in light of the NLRB’s 
recent complaint naming McDonald’s USA LLC, a joint employer with several of its 
franchisees.100 
Part IV: The Same, the Old, or a New Joint Employer Standard of the NLRA? and Its 
Effect on Franchises  
In light of the NLRB’s request for briefs on the joint employer doctrine, there has been 
speculation that it may depart from its long-standing joint employer standard promulgated in 
1984—that a joint employer must exert direct and immediate control in jointly sharing and co-
determining matters governing the essential terms and conditions of employment,101 such as 
hiring, firing, disciplining, supervision, and direction of employees.102  Among the briefs, several 
amici suggest that the Board should maintain its current joint employer status.103  Others contend 
that the current standard is too narrow and should be broadened to include levels of control that 
                                                 
100 This is not to say that franchisors cannot be joint employers with entities beside their franchisees. See Dunkin’ 
Donuts Mid-Atlantic Distribution Center, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 363 F.3d 437 (2004) (holding that a Dunkin’ Donuts 
distribution center which shopped products to retail stores was a joint employer with a company from which it 
leased trick drivers and warehouse employees); see Parklane Hoisery Co., 203 NLRB 597 (1973) overruled by citing 
N.L.R.B. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pennsylvania, Inc., 691 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding a franchisor and 
franchisee as joint employers); H.A. Green Decorating Co., 299 NLRB 157 (1990) (naming a franchisor  
101 TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798 (1984), citing N.L.R.B. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pennsylvania, Inc., 691 F.2d 
1117 (3d Cir. 1982).  
102 Laerco Transportation, 269 N.L.R.B. 324, 325 (1984). 
103 Brief for the General Counsel of the NLRB as Amici Curiae, Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pennsylvania, Inc., 259 
N.L.R.B. (1981) enforced, 691 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1982) (supporting a return to the prior, broader standard); Brief 
for Coalition for a Democratic Workplace et al. as Amici Curiae, Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pennsylvania, Inc., 259 
N.L.R.B. (1981) enforced, 691 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1982) (supporting maintaining the same narrow standard); Brief 
for Professors of Labor and Employment Law as Amici Curiae, Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pennsylvania, Inc., 259 
N.L.R.B. (1981) enforced, 691 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1982).  
are indirect.  These arguments and conflicting opinions regarding the joint employer doctrine are 
not new to the Board.104  
1. What would maintaining the same joint employer standard mean for franchises? 
If the current joint employer standard is maintained, two results may follow: (1) the 
standard will continue insulating franchisors from joint employer status and thus NLRA 
jurisdiction or (2) the facts and circumstances regarding direct control of certain franchisors will 
lead the Board to deem at least some franchisors joint employers with their franchisees.  If the 
current standard is maintained, most franchisors will continue to avoid joint employer status.  
The focus of this section will be the latter possibility under the current standard.    
Historically, franchisors controlled their franchisees through mandatory guidelines, 
quality control standards, and policies.105  In turn, as the franchisees adhered to these obligations 
set forth by the franchisor, these procedures affected the labor relations between the franchisee 
and its employees.106  Hence, the type of control that franchisors have over the employees of 
their franchisees is indirect, which does not meet the requirements of the current joint employer 
standard.107  Because of the chain of control—from the franchisor to the franchisee, then from 
                                                 
104 See Airborne Express, 338 N.L.R.B. 597 (2002) (Member Liebman, concurring).  
105 Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract, supra note __.  
106 One franchise agreement between McDonald’s, USA, LLC and a franchisee included a section on manuals, 
explaining the franchisor will provide detailed manuals to the franchisee regarding “(a) required operations 
procedures; (b) methods of inventory control; (c) bookkeeping and accounting procedures; (d) business practices 
and policies; and (e) other management and advertising policies. Franchisee agreed to promptly adopt and use 
exclusively the formulas, methods, and policies contained in the business manuals.” The agreement goes on to 
mandate the franchisee to require its employees to wear uniforms, present a neat and clean appearance, and render 
competent and courteous service to customers. Record, Franchise Agreement at 3, Dorothy Graham v. City of New 
York, No. 501937/2013 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013); A New Yorker article purported that McDonald’s “exercises, through 
its standard contract, the most elaborate possible control over virtually every aspect of its franchisees’ operations, 
and the pay and the treatment of workers are very largely determined by that control.”  William Finnegan, Dignity: 
Fast-food workers and a new form of labor activism, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 15, 2014, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/15/dignity-4. 
107 TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798 (1984), enfd. 772 D.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1985); Laerco Transportation, 269 N.L.R.B. 
324, 325 (1984).  
the franchisee to its employees—is indirect, the franchisor was not a joint employer with its 
franchisees under the NLRA.108  
It appears, however, that in light of technological advancements, some franchisors may 
have the capacity to control employees in a new and more direct manner.109  Franchisors with 
direct and immediate control over labor relations that jointly share or co-determine matters 
governing the essential terms and conditions of employment will be named joint employers with 
their franchisees even if the current standard remains.110  With new computer software programs 
that contain real-time information on gross sales and minute-by-minute labor costs, some 
franchisors now have the capacity to signal employees to leave for the day, completing their 
shift.111  A recent New Yorker article recounts the details of McDonald’s nationwide scheduling 
software, which is speculated to have contributed to the Board’s recent complaint naming 
McDonald’s and several its franchisees joint employers.112  “The crew scheduling software used 
by McDonald’s is reputed to be sophisticated, but to the workers it seems mindless and opaque. 
                                                 
108 Speedee 7-Eleven, 170 N.L.R.B. 1332, 1333 (1968) (holding that a franchisor is not a joint employer with its 
franchisee of its franchisee’s employees because the franchisor’s control over the employees was not direct).   
109 Richard Griffin Jr., General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board, Keynote Speech at the West Virginia 
University College of Law Labor Law Conference 2014: Zealous Advocacy for Social Change, supra note 50; Brief 
for the General Counsel of the NLRB as Amici Curiae, Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pennsylvania, Inc., 259 N.L.R.B. 
(1981) enforced, 691 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1982); William Finnegan, Dignity: Fast-food workers and a new form of 
labor activism, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 15, 2014, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/15/dignity-4.  
110 However, a conscious franchisor may argue -- successful before 1984 when indirect control was sufficient for 
joint employment -- that the franchisor should nevertheless not be a joint employer  because of the nature of 
franchises and its interest in protecting its brand. 
111 Richard Griffin Jr., General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board, Keynote Speech at the West Virginia 
University College of Law Labor Law Conference 2014: Zealous Advocacy for Social Change, supra note 50; the 
General Counsel of the NLRB contends that this level of control is direct and would make franchisors joint 
employers with their franchisees under the current standard and that even if the old standard is readopted (which still 
protected franchisors from joint employer status since it was protecting its brand), this direct control exceeds the 
necessary amount permissible by the old standard to maintain the uniformity of the brand and would deem it a joint 
employer under bother standards, Id.; McDonald’s William Finnegan, Dignity: Fast-food workers and a new form of 
labor activism, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 15, 2014, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/15/dignity-4/.  
112 Richard Griffin Jr., General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board, Keynote Speech at the West Virginia 
University College of Law Labor Law Conference 2014: Zealous Advocacy for Social Change, supra note 50. 
The coming week’s schedule is posted on Saturday evenings.”113  One employee noted that the 
schedules in the McDonald’s location that she works are no longer posted and that her manager 
instead hands her a “thin strip of paper . . . like the stuff that comes out of a shredder” with each 
individual’s schedule.114 
Technology has changed the nature of employment everywhere. A franchisor may now 
have the capacity to be more directly involved in labor relations between the franchisee and 
employees.  This means that, if franchisors utilize technology in way that directly and jointly 
affects the terms and conditions of employment they will be subject to joint employer status.115  
Most franchisors, however, do not use such intrusive technology and, if the current standard 
remains, the status quo will remain for them as well. Yet, the Board may deem franchisors joint 
employers with their franchisees if the former demonstrate direct control over the employees of 
the latter.116  
2. What would a readopting the former, traditional joint employer standard mean for 
franchises?  
The pre-1984 joint employer standard would mark a return to “amorphous”117 test that 
varied depending on jurisdiction.118  This standard evaluated the totality of the circumstances and 
was rooted in the notion of a sufficient indication of control119 but took on many different forms 
                                                 
113 William Finnegan, Dignity: Fast-food workers and a new form of labor activism, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 15, 
2014, available at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/15/dignity-4 
114 Id.  
115 Steven Greenhouse, McDonald’s Ruling Could Open Door for Unions, N.Y. Times, July 30, 2014, at B1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/business/nlrb-holds-mcdonalds-not-just-franchisees-liable-for-
worker-treatment.html?_r=0. 
116 For more arguments for the need to maintain the current standard see Who’s the Boss? The “Joint Employer” 
Standard and Business Ownership: Hearing Before the Full Sen. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 
114th Cong. (2015); Brief for Coalition for a Democratic Workplace et al. as Amici Curiae, Browning-Ferris Indus. 
of Pennsylvania, Inc., 259 N.L.R.B. (1981) enforced, 691 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1982) 
117 Airborne Express, 338 N.L.R.B. 597 (2002) (Member Liebman, concurring). 
118 See supra pp. 4–6. 
119 Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 480 (1964). 
and varieties according to jurisdiction.120  It did not require direct and immediate control by the 
putative joint employer121 and was thus a more inclusive than the current narrower test.122 
Returning to a broader joint employer standard may have some complicating implications 
for franchisors.123  Primarily, various standards, which further “complicate matters by attaching 
vastly different weight to certain indicia of control,”124 create inconsistency in jurisdictions 
throughout the same country under the same statute.125  The law under the NLRA would benefit 
from referencing uniform rules and standards in its own case law.126  The broader standard was 
discarded for, among other reasons, a lack of clarity and consistency in 1984.127  Moreover, 
franchisors are often national companies, having their franchisees located throughout various 
jurisdictions within the United States, and typically implement company-wide procedures and 
policies.  Franchisors may then need to alter their processes, depending on the jurisdiction, 
throughout the country to obviate itself from obligations of the NRLA.128  
                                                 
120 See supra pp. 4–6.  
121 See Airborne Express, 338 N.L.R.B. 597, 597 n.1 (2002) citing Floyd Epperson, 202 N.L.R.B. 23 (1973) enfd. 
491 F.2d 1390 (6th Cir. 1974); Jewel Smokeless Coal Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 392, 393 (1968); Indus. Personnel Corp. 
v. N.L.R.B. 657 F.2d 226, 229 (8th Cir. 1981) (demonstrating a putative joint employer’s direct control over labor 
relations). 
122 See Airborne Express, 338 N.L.R.B. 597 (2002) (Member Liebman, concurring). 
123 See Who’s the Boss? The “Joint Employer” Standard and Business Ownership: Hearing Before the Full Sen. 
Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 114th Cong. (2015) (for franchise owner Gerald F. Moore 
advocating for the current joint employer standard, in fear that a broader standard would remove his autonomy in 
running and managing his franchised institutions).  
124 Michael R. Flynn, The Law of Franchisor Vicarious Liability: A Critique, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 89, 92 
(1993); also see Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 480 (1964). 
125 Clinton's Ditch Co-op Co. v. N.L.R.B., 778 F.2d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting the inconsistency regarding a 
joint employer standard amongst the Courts of Appeal); see Who’s the Boss? The “Joint Employer” Standard and 
Business Ownership: Hearing Before the Full Sen. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 114th Cong. 
(2015) (Senator Patty Murray (D-WA) advocating for a broader joint employer standard which she claims is more 
equitable and employee-friendly).  
126 Note that the NLRB, as a federal administrative agency, has the right to exercise nonacquiescence, in that it need 
not follow the jurisdiction of the circuit in which it is located. This doctrine, amongst all federal agencies is very 
controversial; see Rebecca Hanner White, Time for A New Approach: Why the Judiciary Should Disregard the "Law 
of the Circuit" When Confronting Nonacquiescence by the National Labor Relations Board, 69 N.C. L. REV. 639 
(1991); also see Samuel Estreicher, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989).  
127 See Clinton's Ditch Co-op Co. v. N.L.R.B., 778 F.2d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 1985) (taking issue with the various joint 
employer standards).  
128 The NLRB has broad discretion in choosing a new standard and may refer to old precedent. The nonacquiescence 
and Chevron doctrine iterate the Board’s considerable deference and discretion. 
There should be a uniform standard, but the Board might have the power to pick among 
the possibilities. In other words, the choice is not between the pre-1984 chaos and the current 
situation but rather there is the possibility of the Board picking one of the earlier standards. The 
courts would then have to give the standard Chevron deference – of course, before 1984, there 
was no such deference.   
It may be argued, however, that a less rigid standard is more equitable, because it looks to 
the facts and circumstances of the level of control the putative joint employer has with respect to 
labor relations, as opposed to direct control in only certain criteria, like hiring and firing.129   This 
proposed standard may also be more consistent with the goals of the Act, since it is possible for 
an entity to indirectly control subjects of bargaining, the collective bargaining process, and terms 
and conditions of employment.130   And it has been argued that it is equitable to hold each party 
that influences these areas of labor relations to the obligations of the NLRA.131  Franchisors 
contend that they have no role in bargaining with employees because they do not control 
employment relations.132  Franchisees who likely prefer autonomy in their business and 
employment decisions may prefer the current standard.133 As franchisors are incentivized to 
exclude themselves from their franchisees’ labor relations (because doing so excludes them from 
NLRA jurisdiction), franchisees benefit by retaining control over their own employment 
                                                 
129 See Brief for the General Counsel of the NLRB as Amici Curiae, Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pennsylvania, Inc., 
259 N.L.R.B. (1981) enforced, 691 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1982); See Who’s the Boss? The “Joint Employer” Standard 
and Business Ownership: Hearing Before the Full Sen. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, supra 
note 125. 
130 Airborne Express, 338 N.L.R.B. 597 (2002) (Member Liebman, concurring). 
131 Id.; Who’s the Boss? The “Joint Employer” Standard and Business Ownership: Hearing Before the Full Sen. 
Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 114th Cong. (2015).  
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Inc., 259 N.L.R.B. (1981) enf’d, 691 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1982). 
133 Who’s the Boss? The “Joint Employer” Standard and Business Ownership: Hearing Before the Full Sen. Comm. 
on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 114th Cong. (2015). 
procedures.134  Yet, franchisee employees likely prefer a broader standard because it would 
possibly open up the resources of an entirely new entity, the franchisor, in the case of an injury, 
for benefits, or increased wages, and rights under the NLRA.135 
Strikingly, the broader standard may continue to insulate many franchisors from joint 
employer determinations.  The former standard permitted a finding of joint employment whether 
the control of the putative joint employer was direct or indirect, and had a totality-of-the-
circumstances approach.136  Franchisors were permitted to exercise levels of control that would 
normally result in joint employer status because the courts stated the control was necessary for 
franchisors to protect the integrity and goodwill of their brand.137   In fact, franchisors have a 
duty to protect their trademark under the Lanham Act.138  The Board and courts, in applying the 
broader standard, excused franchisors from a joint employer determination for their control 
because doing so would potentially “penalize franchisors who must exercise a high degree of 
control to protect their trade or service mark under the Lanham Act.”139  
If Board adopts the broader test there are two possible implications for franchisors. First, 
as we have seen previously, the franchisor may be deemed a joint employer for its indirect (or 
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135 One McDonald’s employee claimed that the franchisor, not the franchisee, was the true opponent of her and her 
colleague’s requests for higher wages. William Finnegan, Dignity: Fast-food workers and a new form of labor 
activism, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 15, 2014, available at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/15/dignity-
4. 
136 Airborne Express, 338 N.L.R.B. 597 (2002) (rejecting to reevaluate the current joint employer standard and 
noting the standard’s requirement of direct control).  
137 See Love’s Barbeque Rest., 245 N.L.R.B. 78 (1978) enf’d in rel. part, 640 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1981); Tilden, S. 
G., Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 752, 753 (1968); “a franchisor should be permitted to retain as much control as is necessary 
to protect and maintain its trademark, trade name, and goodwill without the risk of creating an employer . . .  
relationship.” Dean T. Fournaris, The Inadvertent Employer: Legal and Business Risks of Employment 
Determinations to Franchise Systems, 27 FRANCHISE L.J. 224, 226 (2008).  
138 15 U.S.C.S. 1051 et seq. (Westlaw 2015); Michael R. Flynn, The Law of Franchisor Vicarious Liability: A 
Critique, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 89, 92 (1993) citing Herbert B. Chermside, Jr. Annotation, Vicarious Liability 
of Private Franchisors, 81 A.L.R.3d 764 (1977).  
139 Michael R. Flynn, The Law of Franchisor Vicarious Liability: A Critique, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 89, 999 
(1993) citing Herbert B. Chermside, Jr. Annotation, Vicarious Liability of Private Franchisors, 81 A.L.R.3d 764 
(1977). 
direct, but most likely indirect) control over its franchisee.  But the Board or the courts may 
excuse the franchisor from this status, as done in the past, because the control would be justified 
as maintaining the integrity and brand of its trademark under the Lanham Act.140  Second, the 
Board may decide that the inquiry is fact-specific and in evaluating the franchisor’s control over 
its franchisee’s labor relations (direct or indirect) and hold, in some extraordinary cases, that the 
franchisor’s control exceeds what is necessary to protect its brand and is therefore a joint 
employer with its franchisees.141  If this broader standard is readopted, a franchisor’s indirect 
control that exceeds the amount necessary to justify protecting its brand, will warrant the Board 
to name a franchisor and its franchisee joint employers in an unfair labor practice complaint 
under the NLRA. 
3. An Entirely New Standard for Joint Employment With Respect to Franchises 
Because of the unique combination of a franchisee’s autonomy and the franchisor’s 
ability to control facets of the franchisee’s business, the NLRB should create an entirely new 
joint employer standard exclusively applied to franchisors.142  As mentioned supra,143 the Board 
and courts have historically treated franchisors differently from other business entities by 
excusing them from joint employer status with their franchisees despite a sufficient level of 
control because the control was needed to protect a trademark.144 
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University College of Law Labor Law Conference 2014: Zealous Advocacy for Social Change, supra note 50; Brief 
for the General Counsel of the NLRB as Amici Curiae, Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pennsylvania, Inc., 259 N.L.R.B. 
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142 See Jennifer C. Wang, Interpretation of "Joint Employer" Under the Family and Medical Leave Act-Ninth Circuit 
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143 See supra pp. 23–24. 
144 Love's Barbeque Rest. No. 62, 245 N.L.R.B. 78, 120 (1979); Tilden, S. G., Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 752, 753 (1968). 
Following the precedent set by the Supreme Court, joint employment is a determination 
of control.145  The Board should discard its requirement of direct control in its joint employer 
analysis.  The requirement of direct control excludes franchisors from becoming joint employers 
because of the nature of their business model, which controls franchisees indirectly, but may 
effectively impose policies upon its franchisees, which affects its employees.  The mere fact that 
franchisors implement their labor relations policies through their franchisee does not justify they 
escaping joint employer responsibilities if they are able to effectively control terms and 
conditions of employment.146 
By relieving franchisors that indirectly control employment policies from joint employer 
status, the Board permits franchisors “to escape the basic compromise that the NLRA generally 
imposes . . . the requirement that they bargain collectively” with employees.147  Requiring direct 
control therefore may defeat the purposes of the Act148 because it does not require a franchisor, a 
party that has considerable influence on the bargaining process, to show up to the bargaining 
table to bargain in good faith.149 
Instead, I argue, the Board should examine franchisors’ effective and actual control in the 
instrumentality that is the subject of the employees’ complaint in its joint employer standard.150 
This new standard has three essential elements: effective control, actual control and the control is 
of, specifically, the instrumentality of the complaint.   
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Effective control removes the direct and indirect distinction that the Board has utilized 
and follows the intentions of the Supreme Court because it has never opined on the need for 
direct control to satisfy a joint employer standard.151  For example, “two former McDonald’s 
managers recent went public with confessions of systematic wage theft claiming that pressure 
from both franchisees and the corporation forced them to alter time sheets and compel employees 
to work off the clock.”152  Pressure like this from both the franchisor and franchisees, here, was 
effective in controlling activity under the NLRA whether direct or indirect.  
Proponents of the current standard advocating for the requirement a direct level of control 
in co-determining conditions of employment will claim that discarding the direct requirement 
and replacing it with an “”effective” requirement will open up the possibility for parties who 
have no control in the specific area of an allegation or subject to defend itself or negotiate. Those 
arguing in favor of the broader standard will appreciate the ‘totality of the circumstances’ 
approach of this element of this proposed new test and agree that the direct/indirect distinction is 
irrelevant if the face of effective control.  
The next element of this proposed standard will evaluate the actual control of the 
franchisor as a putative joint employer.  This element is an inquiry into the franchisors’ actual 
exercise of control and not its mere ability or right to control and borrows significantly from 
franchisor vicarious liability for which there is a substantial amount of case law.153  Analyses of 
vicarious liability and joint employment under the NLRA are both essentially determinations 
made regarding a sufficiency of control.  
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Because of the unique nature of franchising, the agreement between the franchisee and 
franchisor permits the franchisor to have the right to control many elements of the franchisee’s 
business. The agreements, manuals, and guidelines provided by the franchisor can be 
voluminous and typically are. These documents help secure uniformity and protect its brand. 
Some of these procedures are guidelines but not requirements.  When this is the case, the 
franchisor has no ability to actually control the guidelines if there are no repercussions for the 
franchisee for failing to meet them.  Similarly, with respect to vicarious liability of franchisors, 
“[m]ost courts have found that retaining a right to enforce standards or to terminate an agreement 
for failure to meet standards is not sufficient control . . . courts typically draw distinctions 
between recommendations and requirements.”154  A “recommendation” may turn into a 
mandatory requirement when the franchisee faces penalties or consequences if not followed.  
The court must investigate whether a guideline, although not explicitly required, is more similar 
to a requirement by the franchisor, if it places consequences for failed adherence.  
A requirement of actual control would appeal to the proponents of the current joint 
employer standard because it is narrows the scope of required control.  It does not look to the 
entire franchise agreement, the franchisor’s capacity to control certain elements, or the 
franchisor’s recommendations.  Actual control analyzes the conduct of the franchisor regarding a 
specific guideline or procedure.  For instance, if the franchisor provides a single wages guideline 
to the franchisee that suggests payment to employees of no more than 5% above than minimum 
wage, but does not enforce such guideline, then there will not be actual control by the franchisor.  
If the franchisee does not follow this recommendation and the franchisor continually suggests 
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methods or puts some form of pressure on the franchisee to adhere to this suggestion, then it will 
be more like a requirement and, therefore, actual control in the subject of wages.  
The courts cannot evaluate the franchisee-franchisor relationship through the exchange of 
documents that allow the franchisor to observe plentiful control.  The documentation is to ensure 
the integrity of its brand.  Looking at the actual control through the conduct of the franchisor is 
narrow in scope because it requires the franchisor to exercise control (and not just retain the right 
to exercise control) regarding guidelines and not merely to have it in the written documents as a 
contingency to protect its liability.  
Once effective and actual control has been established the court must inquire whether the 
control concerns the instrumentality of the complaint.  Borrowing again from the doctrine of 
vicarious liability, this proposed standard must insure that the franchisor controlled the exact 
element that lead to the harm or allegation.  In New York, for example, it is well-settled that a 
“franchisor typically is found to be vicariously liable only in situations where it exercised 
considerable control over the franchisee and the specific instrumentality at issue in a given 
case.”155  For example, a Dunkin Donuts, a franchisor, was not held to be vicariously liable when 
a cashier at a franchisee’s establishment was raped and attacked by entrants because the 
franchisor did not require specific security measures of its franchisees.156  Although the 
franchisor in that case had made recommendations about security measures the Court held that 
since these were recommendations and not requirements, security was out of the scope of 
effective and actual control of the franchisor and therefore it was not vicariously liable.157  
Applying this standard in the context of the NLRA will be a simple extension of this doctrine.  
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If a franchisor requires that franchisees institute a policy to prohibit collective activity of 
Section 7 of the NLRA and an aggrieved employee seeks to hold the franchisor responsible for 
this apparent unfair labor practice. It will be apparent that the instrumentality of the injury is 
controlled by the franchisor and therefore, if that control is effective and actual, it shall be a joint 
employer in the action.  
Part V: Conclusion 
 
Because traditional notions of the American workforce and the employer-employee 
relationship have blurred in the last half-century, the joint employer doctrine was created. This 
doctrine enables employees to hold the appropriate party responsible for their grievances under 
the NLRA.  Franchises’ unique model with inherent autonomy of the franchisees and control by 
the franchisors calls for a unique standard that is as malleable as the modern workplace. A joint 
employer standard for franchises that examines a franchisor’s effective and actual control in the 
instrumentality that is the subject of the employees’ complaint would help achieve equity for the 
aggrieved part, franchisees, and franchisors and provides a solid framework to evaluate the 
circumstances while also maintaining fluidity to adapt to the modern workplace and business 
models.  
  
